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cation-based testing.We have built a set of tools to automatically test software applications for violations of safety propertiesexpressed in temporal logic. Our testing system automatically constructs nite state machine oracles corre-sponding to safety properties, builds test harnesses, and integrates them with the application. The test harnessthen generates inputs automatically to test the application.We describe a study examining the feasibility of this approach for testing industrial applications. To conductthis study we formally modeled an Automatic Protection Switching system (APS), which is an applicationcommon to many telephony systems. We then asked a number of computer science graduate students to developseveral versions of the APS and use our tools to test them. We found that the tools are very e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consumes a signicant portion of its development resources. Although many other factors contribute to thissituation { such as the need to use sophisticated hardware labs and the need to regression test the core systemafter new features are added { the cost of having people select tests and evaluate test data gures prominentlyamong them.Despite advances in testing that have lessened the dependence on human eort, we believe that reactivesystems have some special characteristics that inhibit the use of these advances and force manual performanceof many testing activities: Time-dependent behaviors.A reactive system's output often depends not only on its current input, but also on the system history.This makes it dicult to calculate the input-output relations needed to evaluate test results. Multiple acceptable outputs.Many techniques assume that test results are unique. This is untrue for nondeterministic systems and whenan application's requirements are underspecied. Incomplete specications.In practice it is rare for an entire feature to be formally specied. Consequently, testing techniques thatdevelop oracles from a complete specication of a system are often impractical. Low failure rates.To gain condence in a reactive system's reliability and availability it is often necessary to run a largenumber of tests. As failures become less frequent, the eciency of having people evaluate test results dropsdramatically. Testing techniques should alert developers only when a failure has occurred, rather thanrequire developers to evaluate test results by hand.We have developed a toolset that supports highly automated testing of reactive systems. In our approach,requirements are specied as a restricted class of temporal logic safety properties [15]. From these specicationswe automatically generate nite state machines (FSMs) that accept the language of input-output traces thatviolate the safety properties. The resulting FSM's are used to generate test inputs, which are fed to the actualsystem to determine whether or not its output violates one of the safety properties. If a violation occurs, ourtools automatically alert the user and indicate which safety property has been violated. Furthermore, our toolsprovide an execution trace leading to the violation.Temporal logic is the basis of our approach, so by denition it supports time-dependent behaviors. Temporallogic naturally describes non-determinism and, therefore, multiple acceptable outputs are easily accommodated.We do not assume that specications are complete; any well-formed temporal logic safety property can be tested.Most importantly, our approach completely eliminates human involvement in the selection of test data, thedevelopment of test harnesses, and the evaluation of test results.In order to assess the suitability and advantages of our approach on industrial systems, we have applied ourtoolset to several implementations of an Automatic Protection Switching (APS) system [2]. The purpose of thissystem is to manageM redundant resources { such as phone lines { to ensure that N < M of the highest-qualityresources are always selected for use. In earlier work, Ardis et al. [1] used temporal logic safety properties toformally specify the APS requirements. Based on this specication, we developed thirty APS implementationsand tested them on literally millions of test cases. Our toolset automatically found and revealed violations of therequirements.This work was inspired by Dillon&Yu [7], who present a method for testing reactive software against speci-cations written in a version of temporal logic called Graphical Interval Logic [6]. Properties written in this logicare translated into FSM's whose language is the set of executions that violate the given property; the resultingFSM's are then used to generate test inputs. Dillon and Yu indicate that they are currently developing tools tosupport this method, and that they will be integrated with Richardson's TAOS [20] test management system.Parissis&Ouabdesselam [18] present a technique for testing whether reactive software satises specicationswritten in Lustre [10], a synchronous data-ow language that can also be viewed as a temporal logic.We have used standard temporal logic { rather than Graphical Interval Logic or Lustre { mainly to takeadvantage of some temporal logic tools that we had developed in the course of earlier work [13].Richardson et al. [21] present an approach for deriving oracles from formalmulti-paradigm specications. Ourapproach is focused on temporal logic safety properties, and oracles are derived automatically.Our work extends these eorts through an industrial case study.2








APPLICATIONFigure 2: Architecture of the testing system.The safety properties themselves are composed of signals, the standard boolean operators, simple temporaloperators: previous, since, has-always-been, once, and back-to, and a bounded-response operator (property S1 inFigure 1 is an example of a bounded response property). See [15, 13] for formal denitions of the operators.3.3 The ToolsetWe have developed techniques and tools that automatically test whether a software application satises temporallogic safety properties. Testing whether an application satises a safety property is equivalent to observingwhether it has any nite executions that violate the safety property. Thus, our testing system has two goals: togenerate test cases that lead to violations, and to identify violations as quickly as possible and without humanintervention. To achieve these goals, the testing system has three components (see Figure 2): the applicationunder test, the test harness, and the oracle state machines. These components are automatically assembled toproduce an executable object called the test-enabled application. This application can then be run with variousparameter settings to adjust the number of test runs, the number of reactive cycles per test run, and the formatof the test output.Below we describe the test harness, the oracle state machines, how the test-enabled application is producedand optimizations to the testing process.3.3.1 Test HarnessThe job of the test harness is to drive the testing process and to coordinate the behaviors of the oracle state ma-chine and the application. The test harness is automatically generated from the safety property and a descriptionof the input and output signals.During the testing process the test harness repeatedly exercises the application. For this to be possible, theapplication must be designed to conform to the harness interface. This interface enables the test harness toobserve the application as well as to inuence its behavior.One aspect of the harness interface is a data structure that the test harness sets and that the applicationqueries to transmit inputs between them. The interface contains a similar data structure for output signals bywhich the application returns data to the test harness. Both of these structures come with a set of functions forquerying and modifying them. The nal interface component is a set of functions for initializing, executing, andshutting down the application.As long as this interface is respected, the application can be linked with the the test harness to create anexecutable system. A portion of the interface functions (written in C) appears in Figure 3.3.3.2 Oracle State MachinesIn order to generate test cases, our system uses the following important fact about safety properties [23]:For any safety property, there exists a nite-state machine whose language is the set of all possiblenite executions that violate the property.We refer to these nite-state machines as oracles, and they are the mechanism by which an application's awsare revealed. In our toolset, oracle state machines are constructed through the following chain of events. First,4
structure { /* ... */ } ELEVinputs;structure { /* ... */ } ELEVoutputs;void ELEV_set<SIGNAME>(BOOL, ELEVoutputs *);void ELEV_set<SIGNAME>(BOOL, ELEVinputs *);void ELEV_test<SIGNAME>(BOOL, ELEVoutputs *);void ELEV_test<SIGNAME>(BOOL, ELEVinputs *);void ELEV_RESET();void ELEV_CLEANUP();void ELEV(ELEVinputs *inputs,ELEVoutputs *outputs);Figure 3: Interface functions generated for an elevator application.safety properties are specied by the system engineer using the temporal logic syntax described earlier [13]. Next,as an engineering convenience, our toolset automatically translates the temporal logic formulae into Esterel [3]programs. These programs express deterministic nite-state machines, which we extract easily by invoking theEsterel compiler. The resulting information is then automatically analyzed and eventually linked with the testharness and the application.The state machine information includes a list of states, the start state, the accepting states, and a set oftransitions labeled with both input and output signals. Each state transition is labeled with a pair < I;O >,where I is a set of simultaneous input signals to be provided to the application under test, and O is a possible setof simultaneous output signals produced in response by the application. Therefore, state transitions are basedon a combination of the inputs given to the system and the outputs received from it.The language of the generated state machine is the set of all sequences < I1; O1 >< I2; O2 >    < In; On >that violate the safety property. Thus, accepting states of the state machine indicate a violation | the machineis driven into a accepting state if and only if a safety property has been violated.3.3.3 The Test-enabled ApplicationThe oracle, the test harness, and the application are automatically linked to produce the test-enabled application.This application operates in a simple stimulus-response cycle. First the harness queries the oracle to determinewhich inputs should be given to the application. Next, the oracle randomly selects a set of inputs from its currentstate. The harness then invokes the application with these inputs, and waits for the application to produce a setof outputs in reaction. Once these outputs are received by the harness, they are combined with the inputs andare sent to the oracle. From its current state, the oracle then takes the transition that is labeled with this set ofsignals (this transition exists and it is unique, since the oracle is deterministic). The oracle then moves to thetarget state of the transition, and the cycle is repeated.If the oracle reaches an accepting state, the safety property has been violated. Otherwise, the cycle repeatsuntil a violation is detected or the maximumtest sequence length has been reached, after which the test is deemedinconclusive and is aborted. The user can set at run time the maximum test sequence, the number of sequencesto generate and the format and content of the test results.As a convenience, the system can be made to report entire test traces. In the event that a violation is detectedthis allows users to reproduce and analyze the violation using a debugger.3.3.4 OptimizationsAutomated analysis of the FSM allows us to optimize the testing process. One optimization involves separatingthe oracle's states into safe and unsafe states. Unsafe states are those from which an accepting state is reachable:all the rest are safe. If the oracle reaches a safe state during testing, the test is aborted. This avoids uselesscycling, for instance, when an initialization property is being tested and the application initializes successfully.Another optimization is to actively avoid safe states by selecting only input signals that have a chance ofdriving the machine into an unsafe state. However, because each transition depends both on the input signals(controllable by the harness) and the output signals (not controllable by the harness), it may not be possible toavoid all safe states. This optimization is most useful when the application contains an \exit" signal, or containsother signals that change the system's mode in such a way that the safety properties can no longer be violated.The eect of this optimization is to generate longer, more useful test sequences.5
Oracle state machines can be quite large. One size-reducing optimization is to use mutual exclusion andimplication directives within the specication. This information is passed to the Esterel compiler, which usesit to construct more space-ecient oracles.3.4 A Small ExampleAs a small example of this technique, suppose we have a simple elevator in a building with three oors. The inputsto the elevator are GO-1, GO-2, and GO-3, corresponding to request buttons for each oor. The outputs from theelevator are OPEN and CLOSED { corresponding to the state of the door, MOVING and STOPPED { corresponding tothe motion of the elevator, and F-1, F-2, and F-3 { corresponding to the oor the elevator is currently on. Weassume that the elevator is on exactly one oor at any given time (if it is between oors, it outputs the numberof the oor it last visited). We also assume that it is either moving or stopped (but clearly not both), and itsdoor is either open or closed (but clearly not both). It is initially stopped on the rst oor with its door open.A very basic safety property of most elevators is that when the door is open, the elevator is stopped: that is,there is no execution of the elevator in which both OPEN and MOVING are simultaneously output.The set of all possible nite executions (over the elevator's inputs and outputs) violating this property consistsof sequences of the form < I1; O1 >    < Ik; Ok >, where the Ii are any combinations of the inputs, and atleast one of the Oj contains both OPEN and MOVING. This is also the (innite) language of the oracle nite statemachine corresponding to the safety property.If our tool were testing an elevator application, it would randomly generate a sequence of input sets. Forexample, the rst set of inputs might be fGO-2; GO-3g, corresponding to people getting on the elevator andrequesting oors 2 and 3. This set of inputs is automatically provided to the application. Suppose that, inresponse, the application generates the set of outputs fF-1; CLOSED; MOVINGg, corresponding to the doors closingand the elevator starting to move. For the next step, the tool for example may (automatically) provide an emptyset of inputs to the application under test, corresponding to the lack of any new oor requests. Suppose that theapplication in response generates the set of outputs fF-2; OPEN; MOVINGg, corresponding to the elevator arrivingat oor 2, opening its doors, and continuing to move with its door open, clearly an undesirable situation! Sincethe output set contains both OPEN and MOVING, the safety property has been violated. The sequence consistingof the pair < fGO-2; GO-3g; fF-1; CLOSED; MOVINGg > followed by the pair < f;; fF-2; OPEN; MOVINGg > is in thelanguage of the oracle nite-state machine and leads it to an accepting state; hence our toolset automaticallyreports the violation.4 A TELECOMMUNICATIONS APPLICATION4.1 The Automatic Protection Switching SystemAs described in [1], communication channels bridging switching systems need to interface to components manu-factured by dierent vendors. In order to facilitate cooperation between components, standards have been estab-lished. One of the standards for maintaining connectivity is called \Automatic Protection Switching (APS)" [2].The idea is to provide more than one line for each communication channel (in switching systems, reliability isoften provided by duplicating critical elements). If a line degrades or fails, a backup line, called the \protectionline" is used instead. The original version of APS is termed 1+1 unidirectional non-revertive. In this strategy, aprotection line is allotted for each working line (1+1), the decision to switch lines is only made by the receivingside (unidirectional), and a switch to the protection line remains in eect even after the working line clears to anequivalent condition (non-revertive).Figure 4 shows the architecture for this style of APS. The transmitting side sends the same messages alongboth the working and protection lines. The receiving side monitors the status of the two lines, and selects one ofthem to accept messages. Each component may be assumed to fail independently of all others.A standard redundancy method is used to check the accuracy of transmission of messages. We can assumethat the number of erroneous bits received on the working line is continuously recorded, and that correction ofmessages is not an issue. (Some other protocol will take care of repair or retransmission of faulty messages.)A line signal is considered degraded when it has a bit error rate (erroneous bits vs. total bits) within adangerous range, typically between 10 5 and 10 9. A line signal is considered to have failed when the bit errorrate exceeds the degraded range, or whenever other hard failures have occurred, such as a complete loss of signal.Either a degraded or failed line may clear itself spontaneously. That is, the error rate may decrease to the normal,accepted range without any intervention by operators. 6
Protection Line
Working Line
Transmit ReceiveFigure 4: Architecture for 1+1 unidirectional APSThe expected response to a degraded or failed signal on the working line is to (automatically) switch to theprotection line. However, that might not be appropriate if the protection line has already degraded or failed. Oncea line has degraded or failed it will probably need to be replaced or repaired by a craft technician. Accordingly,operators are provided with a set of commands to change the conguration of the channel:Remove line: The line is taken out of service.Restore line: The line is placed in service.Forced switch: The specied line is selected for communication, regardless of its current state.Conditional switch: The specied line is selected for communication, as long as it is available and not in thefailed state.The application in this case is a protocol that will maintain the highest quality communication available whileresponding to operator requests and signal degradation and failure. The standards do not dene a protocol, butthey include example scenarios for one of the APS paradigms.The inputs to the system are thus the states of the two lines and the operator commands. The output of thesystem consists of the state of the switch that selects the current communication line.As we described earlier, the requirements of the APS were formally specied as part of a formal methods casestudy by Ardis et al. [1]. We used this specication as the starting point for the following feasibility study.5 FEASIBILITY STUDYWe conducted a feasibility study to understand the strengths and weaknesses of our testing tools. Our specicgoals were to evaluate the costs and benets of the tools and to determine what steps are needed to use themin practice. To conduct the study we developed a testbed of model systems to which we could apply our testingtools. Since we wanted the testbed to be as realistic as possible, we modeled it after the APS system describedabove. Like the original APS, our model is unidirectional and non-revertive, but has one protection line for everytwo working lines (i.e., 2+1 rather than the original 1+1). We chose this slightly more complex version in orderto exercise a richer set of temporal logic safety properties.5.1 Building the testbedAlong with the initial specication we developed ve modied specications. The modications incrementallyadded new input signals, new line quality indications, and new operation semantics. The modications wereintroduced to increase the variety and complexity of the safety properties under test. The specications werebetween 12 and 17 pages in length and contained between 20 and 35 safety properties. The acceptance test foreach application consisted of testing each safety property for 50 runs, each being a test sequence of length 1000.We asked several developers to implement and test the initial specication. After each application passedacceptance test, we assigned them to dierent developers and asked them to implement and test the next modi-cation request. We continued this process until all ve modication requests were completed.5.2 The StudyTo create this testbed we designed and conducted the following study. Our goal was to create a set of codeartifacts to be tested by our tools. 7
5.2.1 Study SettingWe ran this study during Spring 1996 at the University of Maryland. Sixteen graduate students in computerscience acted as developers and the entire project took 6 weeks to complete.5.3 VariablesFor each modication we captured several dependent variables.1. Self-reported development eort.2. The number of test runs needed to pass acceptance test.3. The results of each test run (i.e., which specic safety properties were violated).4. The eect of each code modication (i.e., some previously accepted safety properties now violated, no eect,some previously violated properties now accepted { no new violations).5.4 Threats to validityThere are several threats to validity of this study. Since this is a feasibility study we are most interested inthreats to external validity.Threats to external validity compromise our ability to generalize our results. We are aware of the followingthreats. System size. Our applications are very small compared to industrial systems. However, much of thisdierence is due to the absence of code to support fault tolerance, auditing and logging, and interfaces tothe 5ESS system. This shouldn't compromise our test results, but may hide diculties that appear whentesting complex systems. Subject representativeness. Our subjects are competent programmers, but may not be representative ofprofessional programmers. That is, they may make dierent types of errors than professional developersdo. Development context. Professional developers may have workloads, responsibilities, organizational con-straints, etc., that may make this tools dicult to use in practice.5.5 Conducting the ExperimentWe conducted the experiment in two phases: training and operation. In the training phase, we gave 6 hours ofin-class instruction on temporal logic. We also provided 3 hours of instruction on the algorithms for convertingtemporal logic safety properties into test oracles.We gave each student the initial requirements specication, which they implemented and tested within oneweek. Once a week for the following 5 weeks each student received an implementation generated in the previousweek, all previous requirements specications, and a new specication detailing the intended modication. Theyagain implemented and tested the modication within one week. All the students successfully completed all themodications.Each time the students ran the testing tools we captured and timestamped the source code, and gatheredtesting statistics. By the end of the study the testbed consisted of 30 implementations of 300{500 lines of C codeeach.During the study the developers ran the test tools over 200 times. Every time the test tools were run, eachsafety property underwent 50 test runs with 1,000 inputs per run. Since there were between 20 and 40 safetyproperties in each specication, each complete test involved 1 to 2 million test cases.6 EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONSAfter generating the testbed we examined the implementations and the test results, and surveyed the developersto assess the tool's performances and characteristics. We grouped these observations into ve categories: testingcompleteness and eciency, the nature of errors found, usability from the developer's perspective, usability fromthe specier's perspective, and heuristics for generating the testing engines.8
6.1 Testing PerformanceWhile building the testbed the developers ran the testing tools over 200 times nding many violations. As wewill describe shortly, many of the violations occurred only when the applications got into specic states. Forexample, some violations occurred only when a specic sequence of inputs was received, when a large amountof memory went unreclaimed, or when counters overowed. These errors would have been extremely dicult toidentify through ad hoc testing or code reading and nding them would have required vastly more human eort.From this perspective the tools are highly cost-eective.On the other hand, the tools are clearly not useful for detecting performance inadequacies, system behaviorunder load (stress testing), or fault-tolerance, all of which are critical for an industrial APS system.Also, the tools are not necessarily resource ecient. If each computation cycle is lengthy, running vastnumbers of tests may be infeasible. In this case more traditional coverage-based testing methods may be moreappropriate.6.2 Error DetectionWe drew several interesting observations about the kinds of errors made by developers and found by the testingtools. First, the most common errors were failures to handle rare cases, incorrect logic, and requirements mis-understandings. In our experience, relatively few failures resulted from faults appearing at single points in theprogram, although many testing techniques and studies appear to focus on such faults.The test results showed two patterns: incorrect logic and requirements misunderstandings that caused failureson nearly every test run (40-50 violations on 50 test runs), and rare cases (violations on 1 or 2 runs out of 50).Again, this brings up an eciency trade-o. Given enough time, the tools will uncover problems in handlingrare cases without human eort. Coverage-based approaches might nd them more quickly, but require morehuman eort to construct appropriate test cases.6.3 Usability from Developer's PerspectiveWe surveyed the developers to get their reactions on using the testing tools. Almost all of them were impressedwith the speed and ease of generating test cases and running them. Essentially, this involves typing a singlecommand. They also found that replaying the test traces while using a debugger helped them debug their errorsquickly.The biggest dissatisfaction came from having to wait on compiles. Each time an application is modied itneeds to be linked with the test engine. This time was noticeable because the applications were small and theircompilation time was negligible in comparison with that of the linking phase. This problem could be corrected,for instance, by adopting a client-server model rather than linking the application and test engine into a singleexecutable.6.4 Usability from Specier's PerspectiveUsing formal methods requires programming activities at earlier stages of the life-cycle. However, there is littledevelopment support for programming at this stage. Our experience bears this out. We made many mistakes inspecifying the APS. As with traditional programming, we made syntax errors, forgot to handle rare cases, andmisunderstood our requirements. Unlike traditional programming, however, we had little development support.For example, in one case we forgot to include a potential input in the input specication. The resulting test-engine never generated tests containing this input. Therefore, some safety properties violations went undetectedwithout our knowledge. We found the problem by examining the traces.When we implemented the small elevator example we accidentally left out an important bounded responseformula (our only way to ensure progress). The developers assumed its presence anyway, but one made a logicerror that caused the elevator to move to the third oor and stay there forever. Of course, no violations weredetected, but the behavior was clearly inappropriate. Obviously, several things went wrong, but the end resultwas a awed program that \appeared" to be correct.Finally, because the tool has several translation steps, errors at one stage sometimes caused failures sev-eral stages later. Since building the testing engine is computationally expensive, this led to lots of frustratingdebugging and rework of the specications.As the three previous examples show, technology such as simulators, syntax checkers, and debuggers will becrucial any time formal methods are used. 9
6.5 Heuristics for Generating the Testing EngineSince the alphabet for APS has over 20 symbols, building the FSM requires large amounts of memory andcomputation time. As the specication got more complex we were unable to build the testing engine on a Sparc-4 with 32M of memory. Sometimes we ran out of virtual memory, sometimes we crashed the Esterel compiler.To work around this problem we used several heuristics to pare down the state space.The rst heuristic was to to divide large safety properties with conjunctions into their subformulas and testeach subformula separately. The FSM's for the subformulas were smaller, but required us to run many moretests.The second heuristic was to put \mutual exclusion" and \implication" directives in the specications. Themutual exclusion directives inform the compiler that some signals will not appear at the same time (for instance,the elevator will not be on two oors at the same time and therefore will not emit signals F-1 and F-2 simul-taneously). This allowed the Esterel compiler to omit many FSM state transitions. For example, an APSimplementation is guaranteed to receive only one input signal at any step, so all inputs can be written into amutual exclusion directive.The last heuristic was to assert that once a safety property was tested it remained valid in the test ofsubsequent safety properties. Specically, we used relation and implication directives to assert valid safetyproperties throughout the remaining tests of an application. For example, the implication relation OPEN =>STOPPED asserts that when the OPEN signal appears, the STOPPED signal appears as well. Again, this allowed usto reduce the state space, but required us to re-test all properties when the application was modied.7 INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS:CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIESThe experiences we gathered from this study are overwhelmingly positive. These results compel us to believethat specication-based testing is indeed cost-eective in its intended setting. However, before we can apply thistechnology to industrial software, there are some issues that must be addressed. In this section we describe someof challenges and opportunities we see ahead.7.1 Synchrony hypothesisEarly in this project we expected that the synchrony hypothesis would drastically limit the types of systems wecould test. This fear has not materialized. There are certainly many systems for which our tools are inappro-priate. However, in practice, most reactive systems can easily be designed to satisfy this hypothesis, since theircomputations are typically quite short, and inputs that arrive during a computation can be queued. In fact, weargue that large portions of the 5ESS switching system satisfy the synchrony hypothesis for these reasons.Even when existing switch software is not compatible with our testing technique, it may still be possible toupgrade the software to satisfy the tool's requirements. For example, in a separate study [14], we re-wrote partof the 5ESS software. This new system satised the synchrony hypothesis and would have met our testing tool'sinterface requirements.7.2 Modular DesignOur testing technique involves a form of black-box testing. Therefore, it is appropriate for modules that haveclear entry and exit points, and whose state and operations can be observed through outputs. In other words,the modules must t into the test harness as stand-alone objects.One implication is that it may be dicult to test subsystems in the operational context. Some 5ESS subsys-tems, for example, are dicult to initialize or drive in the absence of the entire 5ESS environment. Nevertheless,our approach might be used in a monitoring mode to evaluate the run-time system behavior. Rather than gen-erate inputs, the system could simply observe passing signals and consult the oracles to determine whether anysafety properties have been violated.An interesting observation is that object-oriented designs naturally conform to our interface. They have con-structors, destructors, and driver methods. Also, since some of the system design in the telecommunications indus-try is done using object-oriented CASE tools such as Real-TimeObject-Oriented Modeling (ROOM)/ObjecTime [22]and O-Charts/O-MATE [12] { an object-oriented extension of Statecharts [11], there is a clear opportunity tocreate test-enabled applications in conjunction with these executable design tools.10
This looks promising because these objects satisfy the synchrony hypothesis by design [22]. The objects areessentially hierarchical nite-state machines, whose inputs are the external inputs to the system and the outputsfrom other objects. We are currently exploring this connection.7.3 The Signal Mapping ProblemOne dicult problem that arises in practice involves mapping specication names onto implementation names.This can be necessary when the specications are written at a higher level of abstraction than the implementation.The work of Richardson et al [21] takes a signicant step towards solving this problem, but more work is stillneeded in this direction.7.4 Tool EnhancementsAlthough our current tools are written in C, the test system is inherently language-independent. We are exploringthe construction of an oracle server to enable the seamless testing of reactive applications written in dierentprogramming languages, on dierent platforms, and at dierent geographic locations.Another enhancement to our tool that might be useful is to allow inputs to be selected with non-uniformweights. Sometimes testers may wish to exercise the systems in conditions closely approximating its intendeduse, for example, using notions of operational proling [17]. Other times they may want to overload the systemwith a certain type or sequence of operations, for example, when performing stress-testing.7.5 Costs and BenetsOne aspect of the tool's cost-benets is that it is designed to ensure conformance to certain specications. Itnds only errors that can be specied in this paradigm. We need to develop a better understanding of errorcoverage provided by this approach.One the other hand, we saw that this approach was excellent at nding problems involving rare scenarios.Since this is the most frequent root cause of problems detected in the eld [24] (when the cost to repair defectsis by far the greatest), the tool is very useful in these cases.The value of this tool depends on a tradeo between machine expense and human expense. Our approach ismachine intensive but very inexpensive in human terms; therefore, with decreasing computing costs, the tradeoappears to be worthwhile. Also, even though we sometimes found it necessary to re-engineer safety properties toyield smaller state machines (by indicating signal exclusion properties or simply splitting conjuncts), we foundthat the ordinary computing environments in a development setting was sucient to handle the computationalexpense.8 CONCLUSIONSIn this article we described a toolset for automatically testing whether software applications conform to temporallogic safety properties. This work was patterned on that of Dillon and Yu, and Richardson et al.To better understand the practical potential of these tools we conducted a feasibility study. This study washighly cost-eective. It enabled us to thoroughly exercise our tools on a realistic application, while keeping coststo a minimum.As part of the study, we formally modeled a common telephone switching application called the AutomaticProtection System. We developed ve extended specications and asked a number of developers to implementthem. We then applied our testing tools to all of the implementations. In total, we developed 30 implementationsof six increasingly more complex APS specications. (This was intended to simulate the application's evolutionover time.) During the study we ran the test tools over 200 times. Each use may involve the testing of betweenone and two million inputs depending on the number of safety properties in the specication.We have found our tools to be highly eective at nding defects in the implementations. In particular, wewere surprised to nd that there were no unexpected tool failures despite the wide variety of properties tested,implementation styles and compilers used to develop the code.However, we did nd that our current implementation still needs work before an industrial study is attempted.The areas needing work are the management of the state space and the methods for generating test sequences. Weare also interested in conducting further studies to understand the error coverage provided by this and competing11
testing methods. None of these issues appears to be intractable, and our near-term future work is focused onthese areas.We believe that this approach oers some exciting opportunities for black box testing of specic softwareproperties { focusing testing eort where it is most important. We are also exploring the integration of thesetools with object-oriented CASE tools used in the telecommunications industry.9 ACKNOWLEDGMENTSWe would like to recognize the eorts of the experimental participants { an excellent job was done by all.References[1] M. Ardis, J. Chaves, L. Jagadeesan, P. Mataga, C. Puchol, M. Staskauskas, and J. Von Olnhausen. A frame-work for evaluating specication methods for reactive systems. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering,22(6):378{389, June 1996.[2] Bellcore. Synchronous optical network (SONET) transport systems: Common generic criteria. TechnicalReport TR-NWT-000253, Issue 2, Bellcore, 1991.[3] G. Berry and G. Gonthier. The Esterel synchronous programming language: design, semantics, imple-mentation. Science of Computer Programming, 19:87{152, 1992.[4] E. Brinksma. A theory for the derivation of tests. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Protocol Specication,Testing, and Verication, 1988.[5] E. Brinksma, G. Scollo, and C. Steenbergen. LOTOS specications, their implementations and their tests.In Proceedings of the Symposium on Protocol Specication, Testing, and Verication, 1986.[6] L. Dillon, G. Kutty, L. Moser, P. M. Melliar-Smith, and Y. Ramakrishna. A graphical interval logic forspecifying concurrent systems. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, 3(2):131{165,April 1994.[7] L. Dillon and Q. Yu. Oracles for checking temporal properties of concurrent systems. Software EngineeringNotes, 19(5):140{153, December 1994. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on Foundationsof Software Engineering.[8] M. Gaudel. Testing can be formal, too. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Theory andPractice of Software Development, Volume 915 of the Lecture Notes In Computer Science, 1995.[9] N. Halbwachs. Synchronous Programming of Reactive Systems. Kluwer Academic, 1993.[10] N. Halbwachs, P. Caspi, P. Raymond, and D. Pilaud. The synchronous data-ow programming languagelustre. Proceedings of the IEEE, 79(9):1305{1320, 1991.[11] D. Harel. Statecharts: A visual formalism for complex systems. Science of Computer Programming, 8:231{274, 1987.[12] D. Harel and E. Gery. Executable object modeling with statecharts. In Proceedings of the 18th InternationalSymposium on Software Engineering, pages 246{257, 1996.[13] L. Jagadeesan, C. Puchol, and J. Von Olnhausen. Safety property verication of Esterel programs andapplications to telecommunications software. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on ComputerAided Verication, Volume 939 of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 127{140, July 1995.[14] L. Jagadeesan, C. Puchol, and J. Von Olnhausen. A formal approach to reactive systems software: Atelecommunications application in Esterel. Formal Methods in System Design, 8(2), March 1996.[15] Z. Manna and A. Pnueli. The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concurrent Systems, Specication. Springer-Verlag, 1992. 12
[16] K. Martersteck and A. Spencer. Introduction to the 5ESS(TM) switching system. AT&T Technical Journal,64(6 part 2):1305{1314, July-August 1985.[17] J. Musa, A. Iannino, and K. Okumoto. Software Reliability: Measurement, Prediction, Application. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987. See pages 227.[18] O. Parissis and F. Ouabdesselam. Specication-based testing of synchronous software. In Proceedings of the4th ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering, 1996.[19] D. Pitt and D. Freestone. The derivation of conformance tests from LOTOS specications. IEEE Transac-tions on Software Engineering, 16(12):1337{1343, December 1990.[20] D. Richardson. TAOS: Testing with analysis and oracle support. In Proceedings of the International Sym-posium on Software Testing and Analysis, August 1994.[21] D. Richardson, S. Aha, and T. O'Malley. Specication-based test oracles for reactive systems. In Proceedingsof the 14th International Conference on Software Engineering, May 1992.[22] B. Selic, G. Gullekson, and P. Ward. Real-Time Object Oriented Modeling. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1994.[23] P. Wolper, M. Vardi, and A. Sistla. Reasoning about innite computation paths. In IEEE Symposium onFoundations of Computer Science, pages 185{194, 1983.[24] Personal communication. Mary Zajac.
13
